

Trains and stations in Germany

How sad, you may say, that the days of the steam engine in Old Germany are numbered. It has been replaced over a period of time by fast and elegant trains, such as the ET 403, as well as by the world's most advanced Inter-city system. Small and large cities are connected with each other in an hourly cycle. However: On some secondary lines small steam engines are still working and one occasionally sees the express engine 01 that was built during the roaring Twenties. A lively past can also be found in beautiful old stations. For example, in Hanover, where the inside of the station has been modernised but the ou[tside] left unchanged for 100 years, [the] 120 year old station of Prea[...] Lübeck. A dream railway line from the Rhine through the narrow Acher valley to the B[lack] Forest.





Main railway station, Han[over]

A Bundesbahn Inter-City service en route

The German Tribune

Hamburg, 19 October 1980
Nineteenth Year - No. 961 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

Security talks mark time as East quibbles

Is the East sick and tired of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE, as the talks that led to the 1975 Helsinki accords were known?

At the preparatory gathering in Madrid for the Helsinki review conference also to be held in Madrid, it has at times looked as though Moscow and its allies would be only too happy to hit on some way or other of retiring from the CSCE ...y without losing face.

The preliminary conference was called to pave the way for the full conference which, all being well, will begin in the Spanish capital on 11 November.

Instead, delegates from 35 countries ...t played diplomatic games behind closed doors, with a crucial role being allotted to the Yellow Book.

This is the name by which the work-programme of the 1977 review conference, held in Belgrade, has come to be known.

If only the East could be persuaded to accept the 1977 agenda as binding on the forthcoming conference the diplomats could soon return home. But it is reluctant to do so.

So the talks have marked time for nearly three weeks while delegates have sunk their teeth into paragraphs, headings and sub-headings.

There has been abstract, seemingly unreal discussion. But in reality it was the result of East bloc fears lest the Madrid conference turn out to be a tribunal at which it is pilloried over Afghanistan.

The controversial Yellow Book stands for the West's intention, shared by the non-aligned countries, of arranging for the conference to take 12 weeks again.

In its first six weeks, leading up to Christmas, the West envisages an initial stage at which the Helsinki accords (and whether and how they have been implemented) will be discussed.

After the Christmas recess further measures would be debated and a final document drafted by an editorial committee.

No diplomat seems so far even to have mentioned Afghanistan, but propaganda activities are going on the outskirts of the conference.

At a press conference the self-styled World Federation of Free Latvians protested against Soviet jamming of radio broadcasts and various human rights violations.

Eastern bloc counter-proposals at the conference have accordingly been aimed at departing from Yellow Book procedure and staging the main conference in record time.

The aim is to rush it through at such speed that little or no time is left for an analysis of the resolutions passed, let alone a closer look at sins of commission and omission.

A proposal submitted by the Czech delegation provides for a mere six weeks in which to review and further revise the Helsinki accords.

After Christmas, it is suggested, only the final document would need drafting. This would in all probability leave no more than a few days in which to debate either Afghanistan or human rights.

What is more, the conference could easily be sidetracked by an abundance of proposals on some marginal issue or other.

So progress at the Madrid talks is proving painstaking but slow, with the Western countries sounding a warning note about the Christmas guillotine — a point on which the neutral and non-aligned delegates agree.

They feel it will be impossible in a mere six weeks for each of the 35 states, all pushed for time, to outline the full range of problems, let alone to ponder an answer.

This point, made by Bonn's chief delegate, Graf Ranzau, has been echoed by Austria and Liechtenstein.

Switzerland made a compromise proposal for the last week before Christmas to be spent on both review and submission of further ideas.

Spain too, keen to add a Spirit of Madrid to the Spirit of Helsinki, has also tried in vain to build bridges and reconcile points of view.

The tactics adopted by the West and by neutrals of sound judgement are clearly to marshal factual arguments in support of the contention that the main conference cannot possibly be starved of time.

They do not want the Yellow Book to be followed to the letter but they would like what has proved useful to be retained and not sacrificed in favour of some worthless compromise or other.

Experts of this persuasion unanimously agree that 35 countries cannot possibly come to a conclusion in the bare six weeks before Christmas.

The East has turned a deaf ear to this wealth of sound arguments. Its spokesman invariable refer to their contributions as constructive and sound a fairly conciliatory note, but in reality they are paralysing the entire preliminary conference.

Chief Soviet delegate Yuri Dubinin, for instance, reiterated the Czech proposal for a shorter main conference and expressed the hope that the political debate could soon be dealt with.

Neutral and Western delegations nonetheless still hope the East has not yet said its last word on the subject. Experts recall the old East bloc tactic of first submitted maximum demands only.

Some observers feel Moscow would like to keep its options open until the last minute in view of the tense world situation.

There have been first signs of mistrust at the Madrid conference, and even sceptics are worried the East might make use of disunity on procedural issues to sabotage the entire gathering.

If the CSCE review conference were not to be held for some reason or other the West would, of course, be blamed for the breakdown.

Lothar Labusch

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 6 October 1980)

IN THIS ISSUE

Pakistani visitor

The President of Pakistan, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, in Bonn with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. General Zia also saw Foreign Minister Genscher and President Carstens, during his visit. (Photo: Bundesbildstelle)

GDR border move bodes ill for Madrid conference

Visitors to the GDR now have to pay more for the privilege: DM25 a day in convertible currency. For the roughly seven million West Germans and West Berliners a year who visit East Germany or East Berlin this minimum exchange requirement is an increase of between 200 and 400 per cent. It is also a serious blow to the normalisation of intra-German relations and Bonn has called for this "unilateral" decision to be withdrawn.

East Berlin's latest bid to seal itself off from the West has reduced to virtually nil the scant prospects of a reasonable outcome to the Helsinki review conference shortly to be held in Madrid.

Is the Soviet Union, which is sure to have given the go-ahead for Herr Honecker's drastic increase in exchange requirements of visitors from the West, still interested in the Madrid gathering?

This question was bound to arise from a sober appraisal of the East German leader's alarming speech against the background of Soviet attempts to hamstring the Madrid conference.

In its initial commentary the Bonn government established a direct link with Madrid, noting:

"There is no doubt as far as we are concerned that this move will have to be discussed at the CSCE review conference in Madrid. It runs counter to the aim of continual improvements in contacts between individual in both parts of Europe."

Foreign Minister Genscher left Soviet ambassador Semyonov in no doubt that East Berlin's move affected the CSCE process in Europe as a whole.

Bonn has the following considerations in mind:

- The Federal government is working on the assumption that the East German move is mainly politically motivated. Bonn — in this case both government and Opposition — is convinced the GDR is afraid of Polish unrest spreading to East Germany.

There was a clear pointer to this motivation in Erich Honecker's speech in honour of the GDR's 31st anniversary. In it he accused Bonn in unaccustomed severity of intervention in the home affairs of the GDR, Poland and other socialist countries.

The inference is clear. East Berlin is keen to seal itself off, and Moscow has no objection; indeed, the Soviet Union may well have urged East Berlin to make some such move.

- This objective was underscored by the curt way in which the move was

Continued on page 2

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Moderation, firmness, Nato tactics

As far as the superpowers are concerned, talks about talks on medium-range missile limitation are on.

Both Secretary of State Muskie and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed on this in New York.

These preliminary talks in Geneva form part of Salt 3, but as they get under way it can do no harm soberly to recall that arms control results so far have been strictly limited.

They certainly do not justify equating either arms control with security or detente with peace.

The Soviet regime thinks solely in terms of either adversaries or satellites, so the crux of the East-West conflict defies solution.

Whatever form the conflict takes, even detente, as it is called, it remains a fight until one side or the other either gives up or collapses.

This is why it must patiently and forcefully be endured, with a view to forestalling uncontrollable eruptions.

Nato countries thus need to combine firmness and resistance to pressure with moderation and conflict management. Their twofold decision at Brussels last December was intended to accomplish just that.

Nato resolved to station 464 land-based Cruise missiles and 108 Pershing 2s in Europe as a counterweight to the larger and much more powerful Soviet medium-range missile potential.

At the same time the North Atlantic pact offered to waive this arms modernisation programme to the extent that the Soviet Union was prepared to scrap its medium-range missiles.

Moscow, while dispensing with one obstacle to talks (the demand that Nato first shelve its missile plans), has chosen to set up another.

It now insists on talks dealing with all systems based in Western Europe that could hit targets in the Soviet Union. In the West this category of weapons is known as forward-based systems, or FBS.

The Soviet Union has made this demand twice before, during the Salt 1 and Salt 2, only to withdraw it later. Will it do so a third time?

The definition of subjects to be discussed at the preliminary talks is important. Medium-range missiles, for instance, mean weapons that both sides already possess and that are comparable.

FBSs, on the other hand, are systems the Soviet Union does not possess, since their medium-range missiles are capable only (if only is the right word) of hitting targets in Western Europe.

If the West were to agree to include FBSs on the agenda they would include all medium-range devices, including British and French missiles.

On the Soviet side, however, only stockpiles of missiles the West has specified — SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s — would be included in the equation.

Above all, the Soviet lead in medium- and long-range missiles in this category would go unheeded even though the Soviet Union currently outnumbers the West three-and-a-half to one in the number of its warheads for these systems. What is more, if Russia is allowed to press ahead unimpeded with its SS-20 construction programme, by 1985 it will be nine times stronger than the West in this sector.

If the Soviet Union were to insist on FBSs as a subject for negotiation the West would have to insist on taking all categories of Soviet medium-range potential into account.

They would, for instance, have to include SS-N-5 submarine-based missiles and Backfire, Badger, Blinder and Fencer bomber aircraft.

Lopsided definitions are not the only danger either. Another is the extension of the talks' brief to include all major medium-range weapons systems.

The larger the number of systems included (such as, for instance, multi-role aircraft), the more complicated talks will become and the more uncertain their conclusion.

Limiting talks to unmanned land-based medium-range missiles with ranges in excess of 1,000km (625 miles), which are felt to be particularly dangerous, is a practical, sensible and fair offer.

The objective, as the West sees it, is to negotiate an identical ceiling for Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles on the one hand and SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s on the other.

There is no reason why this should not be done on the same lines as strategic arms limitation by the terms of Salt 1 and 2.

Nato is committed to not reducing its own total of 572 missiles until the Soviet Union cuts back its land-based medium-range missiles with a range of more than 1,000km to the same number.

The Nato arms modernisation programme and the guidelines for negotiations agreed at the same time are clear on this point and admit of no ambiguity.

The likelihood of negotiations bearing fruit is none too bright; the Soviet Union would be required to undertake measures of genuine disarmament.

It would be most unsatisfactory if, instead of disarmament, the ceiling were set at such a high level that it would easily accommodate the Soviet stockpile, whereas the West would be able to console itself with the thought that it too could stockpile an equal number of missiles if it felt so inclined.

This solution, so meretricious that it can hardly merit the name, could prove a temptation for weak European governments.

But let there be no mistake about it, a ceiling that did not approximate to 572 (or preferably less) would by no means strike a balance.

Indeed, it would be tantamount to tacit consent to overwhelming Soviet superiority.

Günther Gillessen

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 8 October 1980)

Continued from page 1

implemented. Herr Honecker, who has lately been in regular contact with Chancellor Schmidt, felt no need to give the Chancellor advance warning.

• Bonn rules out the possibility of Herr Honecker having failed to anticipate the trenchancy of Bonn's response. In other words, East Berlin and Moscow deliberately accepted the likely repercussions.

• This automatically leads on to the Helsinki review conference, the agenda of which must now include not only the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and human rights violations but also this further irksome topic from the Soviet and East bloc point of view.

The preliminary conference in Madrid has already indicated that Moscow is keen to cut this part of the debate to a minimum, but this is something to which the West cannot agree.

Little good seems likely to come of the persistent Soviet failure to respond to the Western insistence on a European disarmament conference (should one be agreed in Madrid) being given a mandate for confidence-building measures all over Europe — from the Atlantic to the Urals. SPD chairman Willy Brandt commented, on a note of subdued optimism: "We shall have to talk again." But the initial GDR response to Bonn's protests held forth scant prospect of the two sides talking it over.

East Berlin officials chose not to be diplomatic; they have Bonn and West Berlin intermediaries a sharp rebuff.

The GDR is obviously heading for a new ice age, so it seems sure to be chilly in Madrid.

Bernt Conrad

(Die Welt, 13 October 1980)

Dangerous consequences as Middle East war goes on

Whatever the outcome of the war between Iraq and Iran, it has started a new and ominous chapter in the bloodstained annals of the Middle East.

For once it is not a case of Arabs taking up arms against Jews but of two neighbouring Moslem states fighting each other.

The issue at stake is not Palestine, the much-vaunted "crux" of conflict in the Middle East, but supremacy in the Gulf.

What is more, this fraternal warfare is dirtier, more irrational and more dangerous for the rest of the world than the Arab-Israeli campaigns of 1956, 1967 and 1973.

That is a striking Oriental paradox. And the contrasts really are salient.

Regardless of flights of rhetoric the Middle East fighting between 1956 and 1973 consisted of wars modelled on classical, Clausewitz-style lines. They were limited in duration, means and objectives.

In the Suez campaign and the Six-Days War the Israelis made use of the element of surprise at a convenient opportunity to overpower their opponents and gain a limited strategic advantage.

They advanced to the Suez Canal, the Jordan and the Golan Heights — but no further.

In the Yom Kippur War President Sadat's objectives were even more modest. All he wanted was to gain a few miles of ground to dent the myth of Israeli invincibility and oblige the Israelis to sue for terms.

Yet in all three instances both sides chose to abide by unwritten rules. They bombed air bases, not cities. They shelled troop concentrations, not power stations, refineries and oil depots.

Blood-curdling though the slogans may have been, warfare was, for the most part, limited to the front proper.

This is more than can be said for the current Gulf War, which has from the outset been brutal, not to say total, in many respects.

In the first few days of fighting sorties were flown on Baghdad and Tehran, where millions of non-combatants lacked protection.

After initial Iraqi triumphs the two armies were increasingly snarled up and fighting increasingly spread to the hinterland. Since the first week of fighting oilfields have been ablaze on both sides.

From the outset each side has tried to deliver a telling blow to the other's vitals. It seems to have been a case of blind desire to destroy rather th[…] headed target selection.

A further difference has be[…] more ominous. In all previous […] fighting in the Middle East be[…] have received supplies, reinfo[…] and, in the final analysis, the[…] from the superpowers.

In 1957 Washington was able […] the Israelis to withdraw from S[…] 1973 the Americans obliged t[…] abandon the encirclement of […] Third Army.

By a carefully dosed mixture […] boration and confrontation the […] wers on each occasion succeede[…] taining the fighting in the Mi[…] war fare was localised.

This time, however, the war[…] ties are not subject to restraint […] perpowers are helpless in face […] flict they have made possible […] of inordinate arms supplies […] longer able to keep in check.

Moscow and Washington […] hope their erstwhile clients […] defeating each other before th[…] spreads to other Gulf states.

The West, which imports 60 […] of its oil from the area, has so fa[…] ed lightly. Despite initial Irania[…] to strafe Iraq's cronies in the G[…] blockade the Strait of Hormuz […] lar vein of Western industriali[…] sation has not been given the […]

Oil tanks are full to overflow[…] number of Opec countries ser[…] to offset the shortfall of I[…] Iranian oil by stepping up […] output.

Prices on the world's spot m[…] only slowly increasing, but we […] well advised not to be too se[…] Even if Iraq and Iran were b[…] exhausted tomorrow the Gulf […] main a hotspot of world affairs.

There are too many lines of […] between countries in the area, […] arms stockpiles they all, large […] have laid on are too well stocked.

Iraq and Iran might even be […] a war that is to be characteris[…] 80s: blind with rage, chaotic and […] control.

There can surely be no way […] the oil can miraculously co[…] flow when the Gulf is contin[…] with flames.

The West can no longer afford […] solely on market forces or […] macy. It will have to com[…] with the idea of ensuring th[…] capacity to safeguard the Strait […] muz or even the oilfields the[…] need be.

Josef […]

(Die Zeit, 10 Octo[…])

The German Tribune
Publisher: Friedrich Reinecke. Editor-in-Chief […] Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English […] sub-editor: Simon Burnett. – Distribution […] Georgine Picone.
Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH. 23 Schoene […] Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1. Telex: 02-14733.
Advertising rates list No. 13 –
Annual subscription DM 35.
Printed by Druck- und Verlagshaus Friedrich […] Bremen-Blumenthal. Distributed in the USA by […] MAILINGS, Inc. 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.
All articles which THE GERMAN TRIBUNE re[…] published in cooperation with the editorial […] leading newspapers of the Federal Republic of Germa[…]ny. They are complete translations of the original […] no way abridged nor editorially redrafted. THE […] TRIBUNE also publishes quarterly su[…] featuring articles selected from German periodicals.
In all correspondence please quote your sub[…] number which appears on the wrapper […] asterisks, above your address.

■ HOME AFFAIRS

Poll message: continuity with new alignment

DIE ZEIT

Never before has a chancellor — across party lines — enjoyed more […]ith than Helmut Schmidt.

His election victory was well deserved – notwithstanding the fact that his "incumbent's bonus" went almost entirely […] his partner in government, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the only great winner in […] contest for votes.

Schmidt's Bundestag majority now puts him in an even better position than that of Willy Brandt after the successful *Ostpolitik plebiscite* in 1972.

And he needs this backing if he is to solve the nation's problems of the 1980s under the general tenet of: we must cut our coat according to our cloth.

The public has been aware of this necessity for some time. Though the […]uism of the "restless German" is more than mere legend, the Germans on election day were level-headed.

They gave in to their wish for continuity and stability; for a chancellor with strong leadership qualities and yet a moderate man. They therefore opposed any change — especially such an about-face as Franz Josef Strauss would have made.

Even so, the voters put forward a demand for a change in the coalition structure. They refused to demonstrate more faith in the Social Democrats — primarily because of their leftist periphery, their bureaucracy and their dirigistic trends. Instead, they strengthened the Liberals in a clear move to have more Free Democratic say in government.

Thus it was Genscher who collected the lion's share of the incumbent's bonus, equally profiting from the electorate's reserve towards increasing Social Democratic power in the Bundestag and from the rejection of Strauss.

The solid government majority, however, will be no means make governing more comfortable.

Though the Free Democrats have not asked for more cabinet posts, they will certainly want more influence.

They want to pursue their political principles with more self assurance — and this applies to Genscher as it does to Count Lambsdorff.

There is a blend of cooperation and contained conflict in the offing for the coalition negotiations. This will concern the Coal and Steel Labour Participation Act at Mannesmann, social security pensions and fiscal matters.

In any event, the coalition will initially be more taxed by internal relations than by any opposition onslaught.

The defeated conservatives must first gather their strength and submit to postponed reviews.

Though they remain the strongest party, they must rid themselves of the illusion that they steered the right course with the wrong helmsman. In […] a Strauss battleship with Helmut Kohl as a figurehead will not get the […] any further.

What they need is more similarity between political practice and ideological theory.

Like social-liberal politics, the conservative variety also heeds moderation in handling. The same applies to the verbal depiction of the political situation.

Raising spectres — as if the Cossacks would soon be watering their horses on the Rhine should Schmidt remain in government — only leads to more emotion and confrontation. It also blocks the way towards the political middle of the road where the conservatives suffered their defeat.

The opposition was right when it introduced a couple of snapshots of specific political issues into the campaign. But the discussion bogged down in polemics and righteousness. And now, with the election over, the time hs come for a major national debate over whether we have really lived beyond our means: what is economically feasible and what must be done politically?

These are not only questions concerning social security pensions and family affairs, subsidies and the overtaxed budget — matters that could be left to fiscal and economic experts.

Every penny of extra government spending is a major political issue because it concerns the standard of living of all of us.

Social policy, the field where the costly imagination of politicians has been most rampant, now calls for a review and starting from scratch.

In his state of the nation message, the Chancellor should be much more dramatic than four years ago in putting forward the imperative idea that the continuous slowdown of economic growth permits no further government spending at home and that a further increase of affluence would be irresponsible because of Bonn's commitments abroad.

The state has come to its financial limits for the foreseeable future.

Things are not much different in the private sector. All in all, incomes (adjusted for inflation) will have to settle at the present level. The same applies to taxes and the rising social security contributions.



The winners: FDP leader Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Behind is SPD party chief Willy Brandt. (Photo: Bundesbildstelle)

In fact, incomes policy will become the dominant theme in the forthcoming debates.

The irksome term "state indebtedness" is, after all, only another way of expressing where government debts can reasonably be tolerated and where austerity measures are acceptable, if not overdue.

After three decades of continuous progress notwithstanding the world economic crisis in the mid-1970s, a total rethinking process and a change of mentality has now become necessary.

Of course, this cannot be decreed. It is not enough for the Chancellor to rally Bundestag majorities and to come to terms with the conservative majority in the Bundesrat. He must also woo approval from the major interest groups such as the trade unions, the business comunity and the public in general.

It is obvious that those concerned will cry out in pain when the paring knife bites. Social affairs, education and investments in the future are considered almost taboo. But everybody is rising up in arms over the billions spent in subsidies — of course, only as long as cutbacks in that sector hit the others, the shipbuilding industry, agriculture or subsidised savers.

Germany's leading economic position in Europe and beyond does not permit Bonn to wriggle its way out of international commitments.

Unfortunately, foreign policy has become erratic and costly.

Germany's treasury is the world's largest and genrally seen as a symbol of inexhaustible wealth.

The others are unperturbed by the big hole in Germany's foreign exchange reserves. And in Europe the common agricultural policy devours billions year after year.

The question is, will Schmidt succeed, without straining relations with Paris, in convincing France that agricultural spending should be cut?

The three new Community members (Greece, Spain and Portugal) will make the EEC an even costlier proposition.

In the security sector, Bonn has agreed to increase its defence budget by 3 per cent every year in order to revamp its armament.

Moreover, Bonn must expect to bear part of the financial burden of America's ask force for the Gulf region — especially in view of its refusal to become militarily involved outside Nato precincts.

On top of this, there is the assistance for Turkey, which is of paramount importance geostrategically, and the agreement to provide more development aid for non-aligned nations in crisis regions as a means of improving their willingness to cooperate with the West rather than the Soviet Union.

This basic structure of Bonn's foreign and security policy must remain unchanged. It reflects the increased international and political importance of Germany as an economic power. Still, Germany is no longer an oasis of growing affluence — least of all in Europe.

Except where European agricultural policy is concerned, any debate on cutbacks in German foreign policy contributions would either be academic only or would have disastrous consequence.

The remedy can only lie in this country's internal structure. And it will take an enormous effort on the part of the chancellor to preserve the most important bases of affluence and economic and social stability and to achieve this without damaging the social fabric and without impairing performance.

After the vote of confidence on election day, Helmut Schmidt is now expected to give a diagnosis on the conflict of demands and potential and to spell out not only the aims but also the sacrifices that must be made in the interests of a secure future.

Kurt Becker

(Die Zeit, 10 October 1980)

Self-assurance of left will create pressures in SPD

The Social Democrats want their party to carry more weight in government business during the next legislative period.

For one thing, this is the conclusion they have drawn from the meagre SPD results at the last national election and, for another, it is the consequence of the structural change within the Social Democratic representation in parliament.

There can, indeed, be no overlooking the fact that almost all leftist MPs have been buttressed by direct mandates and have moved into parliament strengthened by this.

Obviously, this gives them a new self-assurance which could prove dangerous to the Chancellor.

Any reversal to the fundamental role of the SPD is indirectly also a censure of the Chancellor who — for those who go along with this interpretation — has been pursuing anything but an SPD policy, notwithstanding his being deputy party chairman.

So far, it has been Schmidt's habit to take note of party conference resolutions — frequently grudgingly — and then proceed with his own policy.

It is hard to imagine that this could change from one day to the next — especially since the shored up FDP would make it hard on the Chancellor to do so.

Conflicts are thus programmed. It seems by no means exaggerated to assume that the strengthened left of the SPD could be tempted to impose its course (which the election seems to have confirmed) on the chancellor.

There was a foretaste of this in the last legislative period.

The question now is whether Herbert Wehner will be the right man to keep the Chancellor's back covered.

On many issues (like labour participation) Wehner sees eye to eye with the SPD left. So why should he act against his convictions?

Friedhelm Fiedler

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 8 October 1980)

■ THE PARTIES

Coalition partners will need to reach a compromise on several issues



It is likely that there will be a number of conflicts over detail between the coalition parties, the SPD and the FDP.

This is because the FDP wants the *maximum number of liberal policies* in the coalition programme.

But the Social Democrats will also have to pursue liberal policies — for the simple reason that, given the miserable state of the government's finances, it will have to pull out of a number of areas.

These acute financial difficulties — in the Bonn government budget and the social security budget — will overshadow *the coalition negotiations. Expenditure* next year will have to be cut back by at least DM8bn as against the amount originally planned for. Next year the Bonn government will only be able to spend 4 per cent more than this year and so it is clear that its policies are going to be different. The chances of liberal face-lifting look brighter than at any time since 1969.

Housebuilding programmes will be *particularly hard hit.*

The SPD is concerned about a shortage of accommodation and aims to alleviate the problem by building more flats and houses — and this means spending more money.

It rejects the idea of encouraging building by liberalising the planning permission system. The Social Democrats aim to gain the necessary funds and the scope for inevitable cuts by neglecting *incentives* to people building their own homes.

In other words the financial incentives such as tax exemption given to people building one and two-family homes are to be withdrawn.

The FDP sees matters differently. It wants to encourage house purchase and building because this indirectly also benefits the building of rented accommodation. It wants to reduce the tenants' rights which now seriously deter potential builders and purchasers.

Building of state-subsidised low-rental housing is to be liberalised — which will release large amounts of money. The FDP also wants this sector to be dealt with by the Länder — which would make the Bonn Ministry of Building superfluous.

Another field in which there could be a tug of war between the coalition parties is that of research policy. Research Minister Volker Hauff and his predecessor Hans Matthöfer have so far used this ministry to extend state influence on entrepreneurial decisions and the prosperity of the national economy.

Several liberals, led by Minister of Economic Affairs Count Lambsdorff, have followed this development with increasing *dissatisfaction.*

The 1981 Ministry of Research budget will indicate to what extent liberal objections have been taken into account.

The Chancellor and the Minister of Finance have long been hoping that cuts could be made in the agricultural sector. But the chances of these hopes coming true seem slim.

First, it is difficult to see how the French government could be persuaded to reduce agricultural costs after next year's presidential election. After all, there will still be farmers in France even after this election.

Second, the Bonn Minister of Agriculture is a certain Josef Ertl (FDP), an extraordinarily competent man, beloved of German farmers, even though they vote *CDU and CSU.*

The German liberals have got no time for a liberalisation of the CAP. The SPD will face aggravation on this front too.

The need to save will also be drastically apparent in the field of energy policy. The SPD wants energy saved by means of state decrees and prohibitions, whereas the FDP would rather appeal to the commonsense of the people and leave rising prices to reinforce these appeals.

As the state now has to contribute about DM40bn to the finances of the pension insurance scheme, the dispute about the major pension reform scheme of 1984 is likely to flare up between the coalition partners very soon.

The FDP has already unofficially accepted that contributions will go up from 18 to 18.5 per cent next year. But it will not accept the linking of pensions to gross wages. The SPD wants a return to this system by 1982 ... rejects this as "unfinanceable".

But these are *not* the only ... issue on pensions policy. The ... sions reform model proposed ... FDP seems the more realistic ... two. *The SPD's* is considerably ... not to mention the proposals ... CDU/CSU opposition. Necessarily ... liberal — and perhaps the major ... reform of 1984 will turn out to ... minor than envisaged.

The situation of the unemployment insurance scheme is even ... here too there are bound to ... greements. It is considered ... economic growth will drop ... may be a bit *stronger* in the ... in the first half of the year ... whole will probably be under ... Registered unemployed will ... scarcely be less than a million.

And here the Bonn government ... have to fork out — at least if ... very unliberally *and* ... continues to refuse to ask ... earners to pay the costs of ... employment policies but also ... *vil servants and the self-employed* ... also benefit, to pay their bit.

As befits a cultivated coalition ... will be disagreements not only ... money but also about principle ... such principle about which ... trovery could rage in the coming ... is that of co-determination.

The SPD will insist on the ... model continuing to apply ... sections of the steel industry ... steel and coal production have ... The FDP will not be able to ... demand completely. But it is ... agree unless there is an at least ... *democratic election procedure* ... ers' representatives.

The SPD has already ... girding up its loins for this battle.

Die...

(Die Zeit, 10 Oct...)

FDP a modifying influence in changing political currents

Since the first Bundestag elections in 1949 FDP shares of the votes cast have ranged from 5.8 per cent in 1969 to 12.7 per cent in 1961, while the number of Free Democrats in the Bundestag has ranged from 30 to 66.

The liberals, who are given to calling *themselves the Third Force, have never* sired an FDP Chancellor. They have always been junior partners in a coalition led by either Christian or Social Democrats.

There have been any number of FDP Cabinet Ministers, though, in 12 years in harness with the CDU and, assuming the current coalition will continue until 1984, at least 15 years alongside the SPD.

Fifteen years are arguably too long a period in harness with another party for the FDP to be sure of retaining a separate, distinct identity.

But what about the years in coalition with the Christian Democrats? Except for 1957 to 1961, when the CDU enjoyed an absolute majority in the Bundestag, the FDP were Christian Democrat stablemates from 1949 to 1966.

Relations between Liberals and Christian Democrats were by no means always harmonious. There were many occasions on which they were at loggerheads.

In February 1956 there was a split in the FDP ranks, largely on account of *Thomas Dehler's criticism* of Adenauer's foreign policy, especially the terms on which the Saar was to be returned to Germany.

The FDP Cabinet Ministers and 16 MPs quit the party, while the 25-member Free Democrat rump in the Bundestag quit *the coalition* with the Christian Democrats.

In 1957 Adenauer's party won an absolute majority but in 1961, the year the Berlin Wall went up and Willy Brandt first campaigned as SPD Shadow Chancellor, the Free Democrats were back with a vengeance.

In November that year the FDP, having polled a record 12.7 per cent, was back in coalition with the CDU.

Free Democrat leader Erich Mende, critical of Konrad Adenauer's handling of the Berlin Wall situation, had campaigned on a platform of coalition with the CDU but not with Adenauer as Chancellor.

But *after* weeks of *deadlock* Mende agreed to accept Adenauer as Chancellor for an interim period and established an indelible reputation as a turncoat, or rather: a man who went back on his word.

In 1962 the five FDP Ministers tendered their resignation over the *Spiegel affair in which Defence Minister* Franz Josef Strauss had arrested staff and searched the offices of the Hamburg newsweekly.

Herr Strauss was obliged to resign, whereupon the Free Democrats returned to the coalition fold.

In autumn 1966 the Free Democrats forced Adenauer's successor as Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, to resign. They refused to *agree to tax increases to balance* the budget.

The next three years, December 1966 to October 1969, saw the FDP out in the cold. The 49 Free Democrats were alone in opposition to a Grand Coalition of Christian and Social Democrats led by Kurt Georg Kiesinger.

The Christian Democrats were keen on plans to abandon proportional representation and introduce a majority, constituency voting system that would have meant curtains for the FDP.

It was a period in which the Free *Democrats reappraised their policy.* As Werner Maihofer, later Bonn Interior Minister, put it:

"For us liberals private enterprise continues to be an essential but is no longer the sole prerequisite of a liberal society."

This sentiment *was the forerunner* of what emerged as the Freiburg manifesto, and the Free Democrats gradually came to realise how much they had in common with the SPD, especially ... German Question.

In 1967 the FDP executive ... policy document *endorsing* ... of the GDR and the Oder-Neisse ... the border between Germany ... land.

Back in 1952, it was recalled ... Georg Pfleiderer had submitted ... versial FDP proposals aimed at ... *cation of Germany.*

At the beginning of 1969 the ... Democrats backed Gustav Heinemann ... the SPD candidate, as head ... That autumn their parliamentary ... were thinned to a bare 30, but ... just enough to form a coalition ... SPD, led by Willy Brandt.

But crises racked the party ... in a number of state assembly ... to poll the five per cent ... ensure parliamentary representation ... Erich Mende and his friends ... floor to join the CDU.

This was symptomatic of ... FDP membership and support ... Democrats could no longer rely ... dle class and farming support ... *their ranks were swelled* by ... graduates, white-collar workers ... skilled artisans.

By the next general election ... the FDP had overcome *the* ... polled 8.4 per cent and increased ... number of MPs to 42.

The Free Democrats spent 17 ... coalition with the CDU but ... been 11 years in harness with the ...

Continued on page 5

Continued from page 4

The CDU era was often turbulent, whereas the SPD has proved more tolerant towards its junior partner in Bonn.

Yet even a rod of silk has been rated unbending, so much so that the FDP has been dismissed as part and parcel of the SPD bloc.

A junior partner *in* a coalition will always run the risk of being stifled by its larger ally. So the Free Democrats have no choice but to make a point of being *different and a party with* views of their own that by no means invariably tally with those of the Social Democrats.

Views differ, for instance, on worker directors, the national debt, energy and welfare (pensions and health insurance). SPD left-wingers take a dim view of the constraints they feel the FDP imposes on the Bonn coalition.

The more influential SPD left-wingers become, the more difficult Herr Genscher and his associates will find it to make SPD Cabinet Ministers toe the coalition line.

The Liberals, who once were derided as CDU bedfellows, *now run a serious* risk of being rated SPD fellow-travellers.

The 1980 general elections has shown they can still elicit support from traditionally conservative voters. This may encourage them to think in terms of throwing in their lot with the current opposition in four years' time.

Experience has, of course, shown that moves of this kind entail risks. But Herr Genscher is well aware that sooner or later every coalition *must* run *out of* steam.

Rudolf Brüning

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 8 October 1980)

■ THE ELECTION

Opposition delays the post-mortem

Even CDU and CSU politicians are finding a certain eerieness about the way their respective parties have recovered from their election defeat.

The SPD, despite having been returned to power, is riddled with internal dissension.

Yet the two Opposition parties are acting as if they have only lost a skirmish instead of the entire war.

The Opposition's refusal to go into the causes of defeat has understandable motives: in the four years since its last defeat it has flayed itself to an extent *which was both petty and weak-minded.*

It wants to avoid a recurrence. However, sooner or later it is going to have to sit down and analyse the causes for the defeat.

Both Ernst Albrecht and Franz Josef Strauss have said that the election came too early. This seems superficial. Strauss has blamed a "blind and dumb bourgeoisie" and CSU general secretary Stoiber has criticised the media.

Neither of these arguments is very telling.

Similar attempts at explanation are unsatisfactory. They lead to self-pity, self-deception and papering over of the deeper problems. But most of all they distract the attention of CDU and CSU members from the fact that defeat was almost inevitable — and not only because Franz Josef Strauss was its candidate.

Hannoversche Allgemeine

The imposition of Strauss as candidate was more than a mere personnel decision. It meant, even if the CDU/CSU denied it, a shift to the right.

So the problems of the Opposition cannot be solved by assuming the status quo minus Strauss.

Such policies would not win back lost voters or the indifferent majority of *young voters.* And most of all, the party would not appeal to the FDP as a coalition partner. Such a coalition is, at the moment, its only chance of getting back *into government.*

Few changes are needed in the sphere of home policies. The CDU/CSU's attacks on government debt have raised the level of public and government awareness of this problem.

The Opposition will have to abandon its unrealistic and unfinanceable policies on family and social affairs. In economic policies, it has long since had points of contact with the FDP.

Things look different in the field of security. If the Opposition wants to remain credible here it will have to keep *its hardliners like Dregger and Spranger* on a tighter rein. The failure of the campaign against Interior Minister Baum ought to have been enough to show that they were barking up *the wrong tree* here.

The real test which will show whether the Opposition is capable of inner reform is foreign policy, especially that towards Eastern Europe.

It will have to abandon its German national stance, which is unrealistic and simply does not wash with the voters. This is the stance which Strauss and the CSU have taken up up to now.

In the election campaign the Opposition countered accusations that it was incapable of good neighbourly relations with the East by pointing to its major achievements in the past and stressing the need for major change. When FDP leader Genscher asked precisely what *this change* would be, the CDU/CSU was conspicuous by its silence.

The memory of this embarrassing situation alone must be enough to make the Opposition realise that it cannot continue as before.

If it want to make progress, it is going to have to argue things out with its Bavarian wing, the CSU. Given the complex relations between the CDU and the CSU, such discussions will hardly take place without a clouding of relations between the two.

In these and similar controversies the CDU will be able to fall back on its experience of the past months.

It has supported Strauss in his campaign solidly and dutifully, though perhaps not with utter conviction. His candidacy has led nowhere.

So the CDU, if it now decides to move back to the centre, has a right to expect help and solidarity.

Rudolf Grosskopf

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 10 October 1980)



The CDU leader Helmut Kohl (left) and defeated candidate for the chancellorship, Franz Josef Strauss, face the TV cameras. (Photo: Sven Simon)

CDU/CSU 'must face truth' as prelude to revival

Is it the end of the road for Franz Josef Strauss? The question must be asked now the Bavarian Premier and Shadow Chancellor has proved a more resounding failure at the polls than any Christian Democrat before him.

In his initial response CDU leader Helmut Kohl stressed solidarity in defeat with the CSU, Herr Strauss's Bavarian wing of the Christian Democrats.

He understandably did so for reasons of fair play, but it was surely somewhat premature to say there would be no apportioning of blame for the Opposition's poor performance in the general election.

The Christian Democrats have no choice but to probe the reasons why the CDU/CSU sustained its heaviest-ever *electoral defeat on 5 October. They* must take stock of the situation if they are to regain lost ground.

They must not, of course, do so in the manner *to which Herr Strauss is* accustomed. There must be no question of resorting to his mode of criticism, which has regularly entailed taking the unfortunate CDU leaders relentlessly to task.

But a number of unpleasant truths must be faced fairly and squarely if the CDU/CSU are to regain power in Bonn in the foreseeable future.

First, a man of Herr Strauss's calibre cannot command majority support in Germany. The CSU leader has long been aware of the fact. He himself once said he did not wish the country a situation in which he stood a chance of being elected Chancellor.

This comment testifies to a surprising degree of self-knowledge and an even more level-headed view of voters' political *preferences in the Federal Republic.*

Herr Strauss well knows (yet lately chose not to acknowledge the fact) that in West Germany today there is no call for a complete *volte-face* of whatever kind and that any departure from the middle-of-the-road is bound to lose votes.

An Austrian newspaper commented that the general election results had put paid to the myth that the Bavarian leader was the unsurpassed political strategist among Opposition ranks.

Nothing indeed would be worse for the CDU/CSU if its policy were, as in the past, to be dictated by the leader of the smaller of the two parties.

Years ago CDU leaders Rainer Barzel and Helmut Kohl sought to endorse the broad outlines of *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik* for the Christian Democrats.

They were both obliged by pressure from Herr Strauss to scale down their foreign policy reappraisal to a mere commitment to abide by the terms of treaties with the Eastern bloc.

CDU general secretary Heiner Geissler's plans for a major Opposition offensive on social and welfare policy were frowned on as outdated social talk.

The Christian Democrats' liberal wing, including men such as Walter Leisler Kiep, Richard von Weizsäcker, Norbert Blüm and Hans Katzer, were taken down a peg or two whenever the opportunity arose.

They and their policies were derided, yet they are the men who might one day re-establish links with the Free Democrats, and how else is the *CDU/CSU to regain power if not in* coalition with the FDP?

Each and every strategic and tactical possibility of going it alone has been tried and found wanting. The idea of CDU and CSU campaigning countrywide as separate parties has been considered and abandoned.

Franz Josef Strauss as Shadow Chancellor was a last vain bid to achieve the impossible and regain power in Bonn single-handedly.

The CDU/CSU now needs a partner in any such bid. Gone, one must assume, are the days when the Christian Democrats would soonest have reformed the electoral system to put paid to the FDP altogether.

But how are they to canvass FDP support if the two are to continue to be poles apart on major domestic and foreign policy issues?

How is FDP backing to be enlisted, even *that of an FDP in which the laissez faire,* National Liberal wing represented by Finance Minister Lambsdorff is showing increasing self-assurance, as long as the two parties' views fail to tally on fundamentals?


The CDU/CSU has much ground to make good if it is not to be out on a limb next time round too, but a reappraisal should be possible now Herr Strauss is out of the running as Shadow Chancellor.

The Bavarian leader will have to be deliberately cut down to size by his own stablemates, however, and this is the crucial task facing Helmut Kohl.

A turning point on the party-political front does not occur unaided, like pennies from heaven, not even for the Christian Democrats.

Bernd Stadelmann

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 8 October 1980)



■ FINANCE

Government needs to take a frugal approach

The Bonn coalition got so carried away during the election campaign that they made fiscal blood, sweat and tears promises that they are hardly in a position to fulfil.

And, as things stand, they are promises which they must not fulfil.

The promises involve keeping a lid on the state's debt.

Yet the restrictions, defined to the last billion, will not fit into next year's economic constellation.

This is the opinion of institutes and other experts.

The Chancellor and the economic affairs and finance ministers must, if they are to remain credible, make it clear in fiscal talks that are about to begin, that they are intent on restricting state debts.

And it is herein that the curse of the past lies.

Had the same government proved in the past two years that it was serious about restricting state debt, it would not now — at the most inopportune moment — have to do so.

As a result, the coalition partners are now faced with the almost impossible task of having to pare down perfectly justified demands in the various departments — and all this in the light of their own doubts as to the wisdom of prescribing a financial slimming cure in the present economic constellation.

The fiscal planners of the coalition are faced with a position which is as clear as it is precarious. There are two fixed and generally known data: Bonn (like the *Länder*) has undertaken in the fiscal planning council to curb the rise in 1981 *spending, not permitting it to go beyond 4 per cent; and the Bonn government's net call for credits is not to exceed DM27bn.*

Both figures were intended as fiscal signals. They were also intended to be interpreted as a relative retreat of the state from the growing GNP and as a move to leave as much of the capital markets as possible to private investors.

The figures that have become known so far (either restricted by the Constitution *or governed by international commitments*) on additional spending and on the anticipated drop in revenues show that there can be no magic formula.

At the time the cutbacks began the growth in expenditure as against the 1980 budget was already discernible: additional money for social security pensions (DM2bn), defence spending under the 3 per cent clause (DM3bn), child allowance (DM1bn), interest servicing (DM4bn) and additional personnel costs (DM1.5bn).

To this over-expenditure is added a financial shot in the arm for unemployment insurance, the Berlin subsidies, research and development aid.

All this means that between DM15bn and DM17bn over budget will have been spent.

Under the 4 per cent recommendation of the fiscal planning council — and based on a 1980 budget of DM214bn — Bonn should only be allowed to overspend by DM9bn.

This all now means that cutbacks of between DM6bn and DM8bn must be made if the target for new debts, originally set at DM27bn, are to be anywhere *near reached.*

In fact, this target would be within grasp if the economy and the new tax package had not reduced revenues — something that could not have been anticipated when the fiscal plan for 1981 was drafted.

The drop in revenues is estimated at about DM12bn — of which DM6bn will have to be borne by Bonn.

Even after cutbacks in the justified demands of the departments (DM6bn to DM8bn) an additional DM6bn would have to be found if new debts were to be restricted to DM27bn. And not even those coalition policy makers who seem determined to go the whole way know how to go about it.

And then there are the warnings of clearly non-partisan advisers. The data on which the 1981 draft budget was based *assumed an economic growth* (adjusted for inflation) of 2.5 per cent. But it is unlikely that more than 1 per cent will materialise.

To offset revenue drops by cutting down on spending would achieve the opposite of the objective in such a situation. The economy would be weakened still further, revenues would drop even more and the deficit would be even bigger.

A sort of double strategy might present a way out of the dilemma. The coalition's top policy makers have proved courage in cutting back on demands for their own departments and in drafting an austerity budget. There should be no taboos in these cutbacks, regardless whether they involve savings or industrial subsidies.

But the whole thing would have to be buttressed by the draft of a contingency budget to become operative once the economy drops below a critical threshold.

It remains doubtful, however, whether the austerity variant of the 1981 budget would still be taken seriously.

Hans D. Barbier

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 October 1980)

Trade with East bloc under probe

Two Bundestag committees are investigating trade with East bloc countries.

Their aim is to examine where legal trade ends and illegal begins. They will attempt to decide if limits involving what can be supplied without affecting security are satisfactory or whether they need to be redrawn.

The investigation, by the economic affairs and defence committees, comes as the result of allegations in a national daily that a German company has exported to the Soviet Union machinery that can be used for the manufacture of arms.

Management of the company named, Gildemeister Co, has denied violating foreign trade regulations.

Moreover, following an Internal Revenue audit and an investigation by the Bonn Economic Affairs Ministry, it was said that no violation existed.

Furthermore, Manfred Wörner (CDU), chairman of the Bundestag defence committee, said that he had no choice but to believe what he was told by the government.

Allied affairs have been coordinated in the coordination committee for East-West Trade *(Cocom) in Paris ever since* November 1949 when the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia. Among the members are all the Nato countries (except Iceland) and Japan.

The Committee determines under strategic aspects what may and what may not be shipped to the East. The list is under constant review and is updated regularly. Among the criteria are not only technical developments but also the overall political constellation.

Thus, for instance, the list was considerably shortened in the 1970s under the impact of détente, when a great number of goods were released for export to the East.

Such restrictions can only be meaningful if all countries apply them. And only thus can the East be prevented from receiving sensitive goods under the counter.

Cocom operates on the consensus principle. Majority decisions are meaningless, notwithstanding considerable differences of opinion.

The Americans, for instance, now favour a more restrictive course and would like to extend the list. The French, on the other hand, want exactly the opposite.

If Washington tried to exert pressure on its allies to gain assent for its own position, Cocom would be divided.

According to experts, the situation would be even worse than before because France would be free to do as it likes (i. e. ship more) and thus make the embargos of other countries pointless.

This is an experience which German companies made in connection with the pipe embargo when Britain and Italy filled the gap.

Moreover, to ban goods that are freely trade on world markets could only anger those companies who see themselves done out of a major deal.

But these *difficulties* have nothing to do with the general question what is to be done. For instance; an all-purpose lathe might not come under the embargo; but it would do so if it were sold in conjunction with a cutting machine suitable for the manufacture of cartridges.

Unfortunately, views differ widely on what is a special and what is a special and what an all-purpose machine.

Frequently, matters do not hinge on the machine itself but on the instructions that enable the buyer to adapt it to various types of production.

The Americans have banned the export of softwear suitable for the production of military equipment. And so has the Federal Republic of Germany. But other Cocom countries have not.

The Committee members will also discuss a suggestion put forward by Elmar Pieroth, chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee, and decide whether to call for a motion in the Bundestag that would demand "self control by the companies concerned where commonweal interests could be at stake."

Hans-J. Mahnke

(Die Welt, 8 October 1980)

Production quotas for steel

Government regulations are [illegible] down production quotas in [illegible] various national steel industries.

For the first time in the 30-[illegible] tory of the European Coal and [illegible] Community, the Brussels EC Co[illegible] sion will rescind Article 58 [illegible] Community Treaty that guarantee[illegible] entrepreneur's freedom of decid[illegible] his production volume.

This is a foregone conclus[illegible] withstanding the fact that the [illegible] sory procedure (including con[illegible] with the advisory committees [illegible] of *manufacturers' representatives* [illegible] consumers and dealers) is not [illegible] pleted.

The reason for the move is the [illegible] *tive price competition* of the [illegible] months.

Though Bonn Economic Affa[illegible] ister Count Lambsdorff alway[illegible] priority to *market economy* [illegible] has no alternative to put forward [illegible] pecially in view of Germany's [illegible] united steel industry.

To start with, Germany's [illegible] ponents of a market economy [illegible] sole themselves with the fact th[illegible] EEC Commission does not inter[illegible] terfere in the steel production [illegible] June 1981 and that it does not [illegible] for the time being — intend t[illegible] use of its big stick by decreein[illegible] imum prices and imposing imp[illegible] tas for steel from non-Co[illegible] nations.

But does this actually avert th[illegible] of the Community steel indust[illegible] into the abyss of central control [illegible] and protectionism?

The answer is *uncertain* — [illegible] for two reasons: first, forecasts [illegible] predict a further decline of steel [illegible] tion for the whole of 1981.

And second, the biggest bu[illegible] Germany's steel industry (mos[illegible] vate), i. e. the fact that its EEC [illegible] tors are government subsidised, [illegible] main unchanged.

The non-German Community [illegible] industry has received DM25bn i[illegible] *sidies during the crisis*. And [illegible] this money has been used to [illegible] uneconomical plants and [illegible] while German companies had [illegible] *their losses out of their own* [illegible]

All this is a very poor sta[illegible] tion for getting away from the [illegible] which is emerging in the steel [illegible]

Once it is no longer the [illegible] cient but the most subsidised [illegible] who has the best survival [illegible] crisis any free competition [illegible] pointless.

True, there have lately bee[illegible] among the great steel producers [illegible] France and Britain of obsolete [illegible] tion capacities and jobs being [illegible] with — notwithstanding subsi[illegible] so far Germany's non-subsidis[illegible] *makers have been in the* vangu[illegible] modernisation is concerned.

Even so, the Brussels quot[illegible] fect them as much as their [illegible] counterparts; and more *jobs* will [illegible]

If we are not to give up hope [illegible] shock of dirigisme will induce [illegible] steel makers to cooperate volu[illegible] overcoming the crisis we must [illegible] more than mere lip service [illegible] market economy from Bonn [illegible]

What we need is a policy [illegible] Council of Ministers that [illegible] towards removing the subsidies [illegible]

Joachim [illegible]

(Die Welt, [illegible])

WHITE-COLLAR CRIME

Revenue men make midnight swoops on suspected tax evaders

[illegible]*est Germany's* inland revenue em[illegible] ploys about 700 special officers to [illegible]tigate large-scale tax evasion.

[illegible]is band of sleuths, known as *Steufa* [illegible]t for *Steuerfahnder*), specialises in [illegible]ning raids on medium and large [illegible]panies.

[illegible]st year, its activities brought in [illegible]62m in unpaid taxes.

[illegible]ficial taxation department auditors, [illegible]e a figure for comparison, last year [illegible]ged to recover DM6.4bn.

[illegible]ficial audits are a relatively harm[illegible] first step in the process of obtaining [illegible] money. An audit is announced be[illegible] it takes place and in more cases [illegible] not, involves honest taxpayers with [illegible]hing to hide.

[illegible]e *Steufa*, on the other hand, strikes [illegible]out warning where deliberate eva[illegible] is suspected.

[illegible]ually there is no audit first, because [illegible] would act as an alert, allowing time [illegible]move evidence.

[illegible] strike is mostly in the small [illegible] of the morning at home. At the [illegible] time, another team goes to the [illegible] or country home. Another goes to [illegible]uspect's bank.

[illegible] *Steufa* member, Lothar Stähler, [illegible] heads the group in Cologne, says: [illegible] are to be successful, we must in[illegible] private premises in our raid.

[illegible]ot even the bedroom is sacrosanct." [illegible]*-offs play a major part in raids: for* [illegible]*ple from a jilted girl friend or the* [illegible] of an accountant who has been [illegible]

[illegible]x men have a fine nose for judging [illegible]value of tip offs.

[illegible]d, according to Herr Stähler, they [illegible] extremely careful before taking [illegible]n.

[illegible]e make a point of sifting our in[illegible]ation before getting tough," he says. [illegible]*e effort is on larger companies, to* [illegible] the return worthwhile.

[illegible]wever, that doesn't necessarily [illegible] that small firms will not be [illegible]ed: one *Steufa* member, Hans [illegible] says, as ar example: "It can hap[illegible]hat a small garage serves as a front [illegible] huge used car dealership, which [illegible] that we have to go through piles [illegible]les of automobile registrations."


[illegible]quently, the incriminating evidence [illegible]*e innocuous piece of paper on a* [illegible]ssman's desk which can be en[illegible] for one of his suppliers to find [illegible] in the *Steufa* dragnet.

[illegible]gne tax lawyer Michael Streck: [illegible]t every case produces two addi[illegible]ones."

[illegible]quently, *it is the auditors' reports* [illegible]end the *Steufa* men into action. [illegible]her occasions the whole thing has [illegible]known to be triggered by the fold[illegible] a bank.

[illegible] administrative setup of *Steufa* is [illegible]hat confusing. While the Internal [illegible]ue office has the last word in tax [illegible]s, the sleuths are also the extend[illegible] of the public prosecutor. He can [illegible]nd stop an investigation.

[illegible] search warrant must be issued by [illegible]levant court while the prosecution [illegible]sly rests with the prosecutor's [illegible] Disciplinary matters, on the other [illegible] are under the jurisdiction of the [illegible] revenue office. So there you [illegible]: pure chaos.



There are four authorities vieing for jurisdiction and overlapping. And since this means that none has full control, the *Steufa* men act pretty much on their own.

Some evaders hope that turning themselves in will help them get out of *Steufa* clutches. But according to Herr Streck's experience they are mistaken.

On the contrary: tax men only become suspicious about such pangs of conscience. They assume that only a fraction of the actual amount not paid has been reported.

Now Herr Streck has put together an advice brochure for anyone likely to be confronted with the *Steufa*.

In it, he paints a graphic picture of a raid:

"Homes are searched from top to bottom — be it the living room, the kitchen, the basement, the children's room, the bedrooms, closets, the hot press, handbags, suitcases and clothing.

"Seemingly incriminating evidence is not turned over to the police or the public prosecutor but studied on the spot. This can include private correspondence, notebooks, doodlings and bank statements, And since all this is done in front of the seething home owner it obviously makes for additional bad blood."

Young *Steufa* men have been known to be anything but dainty in their handling of suspects — and the fact that in 80 per cent of the cases they find what they are after doesn't help. In fact, the high success rate makes them even more self assured and arrogant.

All this is not surprising, because *Steufa* department heads are frequently fully trained lawyers, though the rank and file know the criminal code only from a quick course.

Even so, Herr Adam is quick to say: "Our methods are strictly in keeping with the constitutional tenet of proportionality of means. In other words, we only get as tough as absolutely necessary."

But Stähler and Adam have also been physically attacked, and have had to call the police:

"Our job has its risks," says Stähler.

Most of the aggression is due to the tax evader's unawareness that he has done something wrong. Evading taxes is generally considered a sport.

Few feel that they are criminals. Many otherwise honest people become involved: civil servants, university professors, *clergymen.*

It is not surprising that confronting a *Steufa* man comes as a shock.

On the other hand, the *Steufa* man automatically regards the suspect as a criminal, just another thief or receiver of stolen goods.

So what can a person do in such a situation? Lawyer Streck offers some help.

The most important rule: in no circumstances underestimate the *Steufa*. They usually know more than you expect, and they are very clever at searching. Once they have come it is too late *to turn yourself in. Moreover, there is* nothing to be done against the search. The whole thing has to be weathered. Attempts at legal recourse are usually *pointless. All the victim is allowed is to* phone his counsellor.

Steufa men, Streck says, frequently press their victim to "confess" while they are still at work. The reason is obvious: they want to get the most out of the surprise effect.

The suspect should not say anything without legal counsel.

There is little that can be done to prevent alleged evidence being taken away.

Even if a search is illegal, evidence is still admissible in court.

The officials are entitled to issue a *warrant for the suspected* tax debt. The recommended action here is to keep the bailiff at bay by, among other things, registering a mortgage in favour of the tax office before *it seizes private assets or* puts the existence of a company in jeopardy. The surety thus posted has no bearing on the ultimate extent of the tax owed.

Herr Streck advises caution whenever the *Steufa* men say anything about the penal consequences of the evasion; for instance, when they tell the victim: "Tell us all and you'll get off lightly."

This sort of thing carries no weight because the *Steufa* men can't say what the final verdict will be. They can also not waive or postpone tax debts.

Steufa is an ambivalent thing. Its *function is to collect taxes and so it is* subject to the relevant tax legislation. But another function here is criminal prosecution and in this instance it is *again subject to the relevant legislation.*

It is this accumulation of authorities that is largely at the root of the public's that is largely at the root of the public's discomfort with the organisation.

There is a conflict in the organisations method.

For example: criminal procedure grants the accused the right to withhold a statement. *Steufa* men, on the other hand, making use of taxation regula*tions, extort the cooperation of the vic*tim by threatening him with the toughest possible taxation, and so circumventing his right under the criminal code.

The sleuths cannot be blamed for making use of the possibilities at their disposal. But blame can certainly be levelled at the lawmakers who have equipped them with questionable legal instruments.

Heinrich Rieker

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 3 October 1980)

Innocent company foots bill in EEC subsidy swindle

An innocent German company has *been left with a bill of DM140,000* to pay because of a Common Market subsidy swindle.


The case, uncovered by the Stuttgart customs investigation authority, involved powdered milk.

Officers had been on the tracks of a group of swindlers for some time before the trap snapped closed. Now the state has got its money back and yet the criminals are living in the lap of luxury in Switzerland, which refuses extradition on grounds of tax fraud.

The case began with a simple export of three consignments of powdered *milk, supposedly destined for Switzer*land.

The Community pays a subsidy for such shipments to non-EEC countries to offset the *difference between the* high EEC and the relatively low world-market price.

The subsidy depends on whether the goods have geographically *left* Community territory and have arrived in the non-EEC country.



As in this case, it is not necessary to prove that customs duty has been paid — and this is the loophole that international white-collar criminals have discovered.

Having founded a sham company in Liechtenstein, the subsidy poachers or*dered powdered milk from* a well-know German manufacturer for import into Switzerland.

The preceding negotiations, which involved certificates of origin, labels and other documents, seemed above board and so 22.5 tons of powdered milk went on their way to Switzerland.

The German exporter applied for and received subsidies of DM46,000 per shipment. These were deducted from the price and so benefited the swindlers.

But the men in Liechtenstein never even contemplated leaving the milk in Switzerland. Instead, they somehow managed to get it to Italy — an EEC country.

And since the same high Community prices apply in Italy — and by the same token the same high subsidies — they repeated the deal from Italy by having the consignment shipped back into *Switzerland.*

The whole thing worked well for a while but it couldn't go on for ever. And since the German exporter learned about the deal and was worried that he might have to repay the subsidy, he asked his business partner in Liechtenstein for the Swiss customs duty receipts.

The Liechtensteiners said that the goods had been shipped to the Lebanon and even produced bills of lading show*ing shipment from Marseille to Beirut.*

But since the authorities knew that the powder had landed in Italy they started investigating. They found that the container ships that were said to have carried the goods were already at sea and the bills of lading forged.

In the end, it was the German manufacturer who was left holding the bag. Under the relevant law he had to repay DM140,000. Meanwhile, his business partners remain untouched in Switzerland.

Franz-Josef Nicola

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 7 October 1980)

NATURAL SCIENCE

A look behind the mental makeup of the humble bumble bee

West Berlin research scientists led by Professor Randolf Menzel and ...hen Erber of the animal physiology ...artment at the Free University have ...en a fresh look at the bee.

Their aim was to probe bee behaviour ...d ascertain the links between bees' ...lity to learn and remember facts and ... way in which their nervous systems ...rk.

In other words, they aimed to find ... which parts of a bee's brain are as...ciated with learning and feats of ...emory.

Bees as they fly from flower to flower ...efer flowers of a species. They disre...ard neighbouring blooms that differ in ...olour, shape and scent.

They do so even though other bees make a beeline for them. It is not as though other varieties of flower were ta...oo for all bees.

Aristotle, the Ancient Greek philoso...her, knew in the 4th century BC that ...es recognise the colour of flowers and ... scent they emit.

In 1910 Karl von Frisch, the German ...tomologist, carried out simple experi...ents in Munich to prove bees were ...able of remembering facts.

He also probed the flight language of ...s, pioneering work for which his ...me is justly famous.

...o the behaviour and performance of ...s (in terms of sensory physiology) are well known and have been extensively researched.

Yet although everyone benefits from the bees' amazing learning ability, little is known about the way in which they accomplish their feats of learning.

The Berlin team first established the degree of accuracy with which bees selected the type of flower the nectar and pollen of which they specialised in collecting.

They checked the pollen collected in the pollen sacks attached to their rear legs and discovered that it exclusively from a single variety of flower.

Per outing a bee may well ransack up to 500 blooms, yet it never makes a mistake.

Bees are so reliable and so easily trained to respond to certain stimuli that they are well suited for experiments of this kind.

They were brought into contact once only with sugar water or some other stimulus, such as a colour or an aroma, to learn more about how their nervous system works.

So their behaviour did not depend on the size of the reward (unless, that is, it was below a certain threshold).

A bee that was given a short reward was then tested to see how it responded to further stimulus. Immediately afterwards it proved highly accurate in judging its response.

During the following two minutes, however, accuracy declined drastically, reaching a minimum three minutes after the initial reward.

Then, oddly enough, its accuracy of response gradually returned, settling down at approximately the initial level.

This strange relationship between committal to memory and time is also found in other animals and man.

The events that establish a link between stimulus and reward take time to sink in. It can take seconds, minutes or hours.

The process probably runs through several stages, with another part of the brain serving as the memory in each.

It is easy to imagine the facts first being registered in a sensory memory, let us say, from which they will fast disappear if there is no reinforcement, or reward.

If there is a reward, the data may be committed to a short-term storage facility the existence of which is indicated by the high percentage of correct decisions by the bee immediately after its reward.

The temporary decline in accuracy and subsequent improvement in performance suggest a consolidation phase in which the facts are transferred to the long-term memory.

Storage and evaluation of sensory perceptions find expression in electrical activity by certain nerve cells in the brain.

Scientists were able to establish the identity of these cells by measuring the electrical activity. This was no easy task even though the bee's brain consists of a "mere" 850,000 nerve cells.

The first task was to find out what sections of the brain are responsible for this storage work.

Bees were trained to respond to a specific stimulus. They stretched out their probosces as soon as one of their antennas came into contact with sugar water.

This is a natural response. They were strapped into position in a metal tube and their antennas then sprayed with flower scent, followed by a small dose of sugar water they eagerly lapped up with their probosces.

They responded in the same way almost without exception when later sprayed with pollen that was not followed by a dash of sugar water.

So a single session, as it were, was enough to train bees to memorise the response.

Field observation indicated that bees behave in the open air in much the same way as under laboratory conditions.

Such experiments can also be conducted with tiny electrodes attached to the bee's brain and registering electrical activity.

They reveal that most nerve cells in the part of a bee's brain where most of the memorising seems to be done are multimodal and supplied by several sensory perception systems.

A cell may respond to a flash of light by reducing electrical activity, yet the same cell will step up activity in response to an antenna sensing scent.

Jochen Erber discovered that some of these multimodal neurons, or nerve

Continued on page 10

THE ARTS

The many sides to prize winner Cardenal

Poet-priest Ernesto Cardenal, awarded the peace prize of the West German Booksellers Association at this year's Frankfurt Book Fair, proclaims in the 13th of his Latin American Psalms:

"I don't want to be a millionaire, a prince, a leader, a Prime Minister. I lay no claim to public office and have no interest in honours or decorations.

"May the Lord not make my heart swell with pride! May the words of my poems please Thee, my Lord and Deliverer!"

Yet public office, honours and fame have nonetheless come his way. Since the Somoza regime was ousted by the Sandinists, Nicaragua's poet-priest has been Minister of Education.

Cardenal, a committed freedom fighter and outspoken activist, was the man chosen to receive this year's book trade peace prize in Frankfurt's *Paulskirche*.

It was a controversial choice, as initial reactions in Germany indicated. So who is Cardenal, a man committed to both Christ and socialism, to both the Sermon on the Mount and Fidel and Che?

Is he a "holy revolutionary", a mystic who has strayed into politics, or merely the spokesman for his people, a nation in search of dignity and an identity after decades of oppression?

"One day there will be no more war in Nicaragua, no peasants and soldiers who kill other peasants," he wrote in 1977.

"Instead there will be any number of *schools, kindergartens, hospitals, food* and housing for all and, most important of all, mutual love."

This vision, penned by a priest born in 1925 in the provincial town of Granada, is unlikely to be fulfilled in the near future.

Yet when he put pen to paper three years ago he could not for a moment have imagined that only two years later the Somoza regime would have been sent packing, the people liberated and he, a poet-priest, appointed Education Minister.

In 1977 Cardenal still felt the heavy hand of the all-powerful dictator Somoza and his clan. In the civil war confusion that autumn a village community he had helped to set up 11 years previously was laid waste.

It was a village of Indian peasants, fishermen and craftsmen on one of the Solentiname islands in Lake Nicaragua.

A few of the villagers put up a show of resistance but Somoza's National Guard destroyed this model Christian community and chased the Indian villagers into the jungle.

Those who were unable to escape were killed. Cardenal later paid tribute to the community's memory in his Gospel According to the Peasants of Solentiname.

He went into exile, travelling all over Latin America and the United States, then Europe, everywhere advocating the Sandinist cause and emphasising the need for national liberation.

His is neither the gentle nature of Dom Helder Camara nor the aggressive militancy of Camillo Torres. Ernesto Cardenal may be said to come somewhere between these two extremes.

But as a witness to injustice and a poet whose work ranges from polemical vehemence to a mystical outlook he has retained a stronger commitment to Indian culture.

His poetry, modelled on Ezra Pound, whose Lustra poems he came across at an early age, deals with Nicaragua, the slums of Managua, its capital city, the country's people and their history.

Thus, when he was forced to flee the country in 1977, he became a crucial witness for the prosecution of the Somoza regime.

And it was mainly his poetry that assured him of interest and attention abroad. It included his Oracle of Managua, his National Song of Nicaragua and his Book of Love with its Latin American Psalms.

In common with all major Latin American writers he deals mainly with issues such as injustice and oppression, economic exploitation and pauperisation.

Yet he has something extra that is not to be found in the works of Ernesto Sábato, Octavio Paz or Augusto Roa Bastos, to name but a few major Latin American authors.

It is a spiritual quality. Cardenal is a "fool in Christ" and breaks all the rules to ignore ideological and religious barriers. His is poetry in the service of the Sermon on the Mount.

"Literature," he wrote some years ago in a preface to an anthology of new Nicaraguan poetry, "must render a service. It must, like everything in the universe, serve mankind.

"That is why poetry has to be political, but in a poetic, not a propagandistic manner."

Ernesto Cardenal, who is the only Nicaraguan writer other than Ruben Dario to establish an international reputation, was first educated by the Jesuits.

His family were patricians of Spanish descent. He first studied literature and philosophy but was associated with the struggle against the Somozas from an early age:

"My childhood was in the Sandino era. I was eight when they assassinated him. Somoza did it. I can remember it well. My family, the entire country, were shaken to the core."

Motivated by what he called a mystical experience, Cardenal spent two years as a novice at the Our Lady of Gethsemane Trappist monastery in Kentucky.

He modelled himself on his teacher, Thomas Martin, the abbot, whom Cardenal says was an unusually gifted man clearly and assuredly combining powers of contemplation and artistry.

He quit the monastery for health reasons and studied theology in Colombia. He was not ordained until he was nearly forty, but the Indians were happy to call him Padre Ernesto.

He wrote some of his poetry during his time with the Trappists. They were reminiscent of Pound but alrea[...] notice of revolutionary impe[...] harsh collision with dictatorship.

Ernesto Cardenal

As long ago as 1954 an un[...] leaflet was circulated in Manag[ua] disparaging song about Somoza [...] by Cardenal:

"You have worked 20 years [...] million pesos. We would give [...] not to work the way you do."

Cardenal the poet owes inspir[ation to] Pound, but also to Pablo Neru[da ...] says he is fascinated by the be[auty of] Venice and Capri even though lit[...] lections of both are less realist[ic than] picture postcards.

"All beauty is sad. Bitterness a[...] are at the bottom of everything [...] the cosmetic mourning of all c[...] to which St Paul refers."

Cardenal's poems, especially the [Latin] American Psalms, have been tr[anslated] into 18 languages since 1954.

They are religious poems, [...] along by the primitive imag[...] myths of old Latin American [...] tions but aimed mainly at people [of Ni]caragua.

Wolf Sch[...]

(Die Welt, 4 Octo[ber 1980])

Fassbinder, an extrovert with talent

Director Rainer Werner Fassbinder, whose serialised film version of Döblin's novel *Berlin Alexanderplatz* is currently being screened on West German TV by *Westdeutscher Rundfunk*, Cologne, has neither a school-leaving certificate nor a university degree.

He even failed the entrance exam of the West Berlin Film and TV Academy. Yet Fassbinder, 34, the son of a Bavarian doctor, has nonetheless emerged in next to no time as Germany's most productive and most-discussed film director.

His oeuvre has varied remarkably and is an unruly ragbag of disparate elements. It ranges from box office successes such as *The Marriage of Maria Braun* to *Despair*, starring Dirk Bogarde, which was such a flop it was not even put on general release in Germany.

Complicated and expensive projects alternate with shoestring one-man efforts in which Fassbinder produces, directs, writes the screenplay and stars as the leading actor.

Political commitment is interspersed with personal confessions that confront cinemagoers with intimate details of Fassbinder's sexual and private life.

For exhibitionism he is a match for Hollywood's most notorious gossip column regulars. But Fassbinder's disclosures do not come straight from pink bedrooms with heartshaped four-posters.

His milieu is a sadistic, slaughterhouse world and he invariably wears a leather jacket, a crumpled felt hat and patent leather boots.





Rainer Werner Fassbinder (Photo: dpa)

Quarter is neither asked nor given in his work as a director, and rumour has it this testified to more than mere commitment to hard work.

In 1968 he parted company w[ith the] Munich Action Theater to se[t up a] company of his own, the Antit[eater]. His timing was good. The cultural [revo]lution of 1968 established him a[s a ris]ing light.

TV companies competed for hi[s ser]vices and he directed one fil[m after] another. He married actress [Ingrid] Caven but their marriage was s[oon on] the rocks.

Women, as his films show, [are dan]gerous ground for Fassbinder, [...] with pitfalls and peopled by [...] monsters.

His favourite actresses Ingrid [...] Brigitta Mira, Andrea Ferreol, [...] Valentin and Hanna Schygulla [have re]peatedly been required to play [...] roles.

Fassbinder has always su[rrounded] them with a luxury environm[ent in] which, to paraphrase pre-war Mar[xist cri]tic Walter Benjamin, all that was [left for] them to do was to be murdered.

No-one would deny he is [...] hard-working and obsessed with [...] But will he never become a truly [great] director? It is hard to say in the [...] context of German film subsidy [...] coteries.

He would have to go to Hol[lywood] for some time to provide an an[swer to] this crucial question.

Günter [...]

(Die Welt, 4 Oct[ober 1980])

Continued from page 9

cells, show a close connection between the number of training sessions and changes in response patterns.

After training they step up spontaneous frequency and show greater sensitivity to scent and sugar stimuli. These findings tally with other scientists' findings in snails and molluscs.

As a rule only multimodal neurons can change their responses, and Professor Menzel feels multimodality is a prerequisite for this ability.

There appear, however, to be two categories of neuron, one capable of change and the other static and thus unable to be trained.

This has also been ascertained in vertebrates and man. Scientists suspect it may be a major natural switchgear principle.


By combining rigidity and flexibility and linking groups belonging to each category nature is felt to be capable of setting up a complex switchgear mechanism.

Heribert Weihönig

(Der Tagesspiegel, 4 October 1980)

THE CINEMA

The personal projection of a 'Dress Rehearsal'



After winning the Golden Bear for his film *Wolfsburg or Palermo* at [the] Berlin Film Festival, Werner Schroe[ter] went to the Nancy theatre festival [an]d produced an amazing film about it, [en]titled *Dress Rehearsal*.

It is no ordinary documentary but a [v]ery personal documentary collage of [ev]ents at the festival, Schroeter's experi[e]nces in Germany, his hopes and his fears, all put together to form a very personal blend.

Schroeter presents excerpts from performances by Japanese dancer Kazuo Oone, German dancer Reinhild Hoffmann, from Café Müller by Pina Bausch, crazy divertissements and wrestling matches.

In all these performances Schroeter captures moments of solitude, sadness, violence and sometimes – though rarely – of tenderness, or at least the search for tenderness.

Interspersed between these performances are a few interviews and some meditations by Schroeter on "home" and "longing", about the coldness of Germany in the seventies.

The dominant element here, though, is the music, some of which seems to come from the performances filmed and some to have been added later by Schroeter. The music ranges from Puccini to Mahler.

Dress Rehearsal is not really a documentary about the Nancy film festival, or only indirectly so. It is far more self-presentation by artist Schroeter, celebrating his life and his obsessions arrogantly and in high-flown style, though at the same time setting high optical and acoustic standards.

This film and Fassbinder's *Berlin Alexanderplatz* were the high points of the otherwise mediocre Filmmakers' Filmfestival in Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Oberhausen.

Rarely, if ever, has the German industry film industry given such a poor account of itself.

Wrong programme policies (too many mediocre and poor films), inadequate preparation and organisation, especially in Duisburg and Oberhausen and above all lack of solidarity from filmmakers outside North Rhine-Westphalia meant that a regional festival which could have had a supraregional impact degenerated into a mere provincial event.

The festival cannot go on in this form. At the moment there are two festivals of German films, this one and Hof, within only five weeks of one another. This is qualitatively and quantitatively too much for the German film industry.

One possible solution would be to hold the Filmmakers' Festival in June. This would reduce the present competition that exists.

Or else one could abandon all claims to supraregional relevance and concentrate on regional films. (Next year's festival is going to be in and around Frankfurt, so it could be a festival of films from Hesse).

At least this would be more honest than the hotch-potch served up this year.



No ordinary documentary: Werner Schroeter's 'Dress Rehearsal'. (Photo: Franz Welch)

Film fans did not fully accept this year's festival. Many films were well-attended, but many also played to near empty cinemas. The fans seemed to have an uncanny flair for what was worth watching and what they should miss – which was as well as the publicity was dreadful.

One of the successes, comparatively speaking, was *5 Flaschen für Angelika*, produced by an Essen theatre and film production company calling itself Dr Muschnik after the Robert Corman film character.

This group's first work, *My Heart is Overcome with Terror*, was a chaotic comedy which cost only DM27,000 to produce.

Muschnik claim that in their first film the cameraman only found out how to put the film in the camera the day before shooting began. For their second film they could afford a professional cameraman. Nonetheless, the film remains refreshingly un-routine.

It is a comedy about kidnapping in which five gangsters from the Ruhr, taking their cue from a film script they have come across by chance, end up kidnapping four children instead of one – it turns out the girl they want to kidnap is having her birthday party. The four girls are not bothered – they find it a pleasant change.

Werner Possardt and Frank Döhmann, the two directors, seem to come up with endless verbal and visual gags. They have an excellent sense of timing and pace – pure cinema full of gentle anarchy. The film, which received no subsidies, cost DM350,000, only DM130,000 of which has been paid, the rest consisting of deferred payments from all involved.

Maybe I am overestimating the film by comparing it with the mediocrity of rest of the programme. But it does show that the apparently orderly and hard-working Ruhr seems to be fertile ground for comedies.

Wilhelm Roth

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 September 1980)

Children's festival marked by contrast in content

Two films at the International Children's Film Festival in Frankfurt starkly contrasted the reality of childhood in the decadent affluence of the West and the grim poverty of the developing countries.

They were the Swedish film *Prohibited for Children* by Marie Louise de Geer Bergenstrāhle, and the Turkish *Yusuf and Kenan*, by Ömer Kavur.

Such contrasts typified this sixth international festival which presented entries from West Germany, Denmark, India, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Another major attraction was a retrospective of films of Erich Kästner's books, including two versions of his *Emil and the Detectives*, one made in Germany in 1933, the other in the USA in 1963.

The three other Kästner films shown were *Doppelten Lottchen, Konferenz der Tiere* and *Das Fliegende Klassenzimmer*. Demand to see them was so great that extra screenings had to be arranged.

But the interest in the other films was equally great. For many of these films it was especially important that the children should afterwards have an opportunity to discuss and ask questions about what they had seen and have concepts and connections explained – particularly necessary, of course, in the case of foreign films and historical films – of which there were many at the festival.

The Czech film, *Settlement of Ravens*, for example, was about the stone age when mankind still lived in tribes. *Prohibited For Children*, on the other hand, was located in a present in which people are increasingly isolated from one another, a reminder of the vision of the future depicted in Huxley's *Brave New World*.

The Indian film *Kumatty*, with its slow-moving, detailed images, strange music and beautiful faces tells a great deal about everyday life in an Indian village. But the responses of the youngsters indicated that the fascination was greater for adults than for them. Many found it boring.

Uschi Barthelmess-Weller's and Werner Meyer's film, *The Children from No. 67*, based on a book written by Lina Tetzner in 1932, described everyday life in Berlin just before and after the Nazis came to power in 1933.

Events and conflicts in the old Berlin apartment blocks, where the backyards are the main places of communication and where well-to-do shopkeepers live beside the unemployed, Nazis beside communists, anti-semites with Jews, give a picture of the political developments of the time and their impact on the lives of individuals.

This film undoubtedly aroused memories among many adult viewers but for the children much was strange and incomprehensible without additional information.

Nonetheless it could be a good starting point for a discussion of how and why national socialism was possible.

Of course there were fantastic and fairy tale films as well as the realistic and even drastic descriptions of reality.

The didactic intent was clearly evident in the very imaginative and humorous Hungarian cartoon *Matthi the Goose-herd* and *The Warrior Children* by Ernst Johansen from Denmark.

Whereas most of the other films avoided good-bad schemata, in these two films the good children and their allies – usually social outsiders – fought against the unjust, cruel adults.

In the end, Matthi becomes a People's Hero because he defeats the oppressors of the poor.

The Warrior Children does not deliver a happy ending. The three girls and boys merely see the chance of continuing until they find a place where "running away comes to an end and love has a chance."

Happy endings were not to be found in a number of films. In many cases the films ended in such a way that the children had to think the endings out for themselves.

Two notable examples of this approach were *I am Maria* from Sweden and *I don't want to hear anything from Czechoslovakia*.

Both give very sensitive, understanding descriptions of children with all their dreams, wishes, fears and difficulties in the family or as outsiders in groups of other children.

Both used poetic sequences of images rather than dialogues to convey their messages.

Films like these give children characters they can identify with and at the same time force adults to see the way they behave towards children from the child's perspective.

They also show that children have a greater capacity for independence, forming their own opinions and judgements than they are often given credit for.

It was noticeable that many of the young film fans found it difficult to concentrate on more slow-paced films because the excitement was not great enough.

Children aged ten and over in particular seemed to lose interest rapidly unless there were regular action scenes to keep their attention from flagging.

Juliane Neuendorf

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 27 September 1980)

■ **MEDICINE**

Scientists seek answers to delicate problems of liver transplants

Kidney transplants have become part of everyday medical life but liver transplants are still a rarity. The hopes that ran high after the first successful liver transplants have not been fulfilled — especially due to the difficulty of preserving the liver long enough to carry out the operation.

Cologne University's Institute for Experimental Medicine under Professor Wolf Isselhard has for the past two years devoted much attention to solving the preservation problems, and has used some remarkable methods.

A comparison with other organs clearly shows how difficult the situation is. While kidneys can be preserved for several days and hearts can be kept in good shape for more than a day, the liver survives only several hours after being taken from the body. In fact, given the best conditions, the longest period it can be kept is 17 hours.

This means that liver transplants are only possible if donor and recipient are near each other and if the operation can be prepared before the organ has been removed.

So far, only Britain has a helicopter service so surgeons can fly to remove the organ.

To make matters worse, liver transplants are considerably more complicated than kidney transplants. For one thing, there are more blood vessels to be linked up and, for another, the position of the liver directly under the diaphragm makes it less accessible.

But the principal reason why liver transplants have not been particularly successful is because the general condition of many potential recipients is usually so poor that most transplants come too late. Frequently, they are a last ditch effort to save the patient's life.

Once transplanted, the liver can take quite a bit of punishment and has a considerable regenerative ability. But frequently the operation comes too late.

If the operation is not successful, the patient will die: in a kidney transplant he can simply be hooked up to an artificial kidney.

So there is a vicious circle resulting from the fact that, due to adverse circumstances, liver transplants are almost always undertaken in critical cases and failure is virtually programmed.

It is a problem that can only be overcome by better preservation of the liver.

The main preservation objective is to reduce the energy requirements of the cells as much as possible while ensuring that the energy they need for survival is made available.

The most common method is to cool the organ and rinse it with special liquids.

Effects of the various methods and combinations of methods can only be tested on animals. The organs removed from the animals are treated and then either implanted in another animal or in the donor animal itself.

To assess the effects of the conservation treatment, it is necessary to eliminate adverse factors as much as possible. If this is to be achieved, the organs must not be taken only from healthy animals.

Moreover, the animals must be as closely related as possible to test the rejection mechanisms of the recipient animal and reduce the immunological reaction.

The Cologne researchers achieve this by working with incestuous rats. These animals are as similar to each other in terms of tissue as identical twins. The immunological reaction in such transplants is therefore virtually nil.

Another important factor is a perfect transplantation technique to ensure in case of failure that the lack of success is not due to a surgical mistake.

This is a major problem. The transplantation technique which has been used to date and which requires about 25 minutes has caused damage in the rats' liver due to inadequate blood supply. Moreover, this has led to serious circulation porblems in the recipient animal.

It was therefore obvious that a new surgical technique had to be developed. The Cologne scientists remembered the "cuff technique" which was developed as far back as the turn of the century and then forgotten. Here, the ends of the blood vessels are inserted in thin pipes and then folded back like a cuff.

All that still has to be done is to link up the blood vessels whose inner walls are in contact with each other and grow together without the least complication and without stitches.

This method has been developed to such perfection by the Japanese Cologne resident Miyata and his German colleague Fischer that a rat liver [trans]plant can now be carried out in [between] 11 and 13 minutes.

This gives the surgeons a con[siderable] margin of safety so far as the [...] the liver is concerned, and any [...] or subsequent illness is clearly [attribut]able to mistakes in conservation.

Rats operated by the cuff method [need] only an hour to recover and s[tart run]ning around in their cages. The PVC tubes cause no harmful side [effects] and are extremely durable.

Having thus provided a basis [for the] new surgical method, the Cologne [scien]tists are now testing the cons[ervation] techniques in search of further [impro]vement.

Once this is done they will [...] try to develop a new method [to the] point of clinical application along the lines of their kidney conservation [meth]od which has proved simple, [...] effective and has thus aroused world wide interest.

Dietrich Zimmer[mann]

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 3 Octo[ber 1980])

An answer to depression

Deliberate breaking away from everyday routine can cure depression, a study by Professor Rainer Tölle and psychologist Urban Goetze of the Psychiatric University Clinic in Münster shows.

In about 5 per cent of the cases of depression reviewed by them a single deliberately wakeful night was enough to bring about a cure or at least a very noticeable improvement.

Wellbeing and fitness largely depend on the harmony of many biological rhythms controlled by an "internal clock".

In cases of depression and certain other disorders the clock is out of condition.

The effect this clock has is evidenced by the fact that the course of depressions can be influenced by changes in the sleep- wakefulness rhythm. But it is still unknown what exactly causes this curative effect.

These processes will be examined by two German work groups with the backing of the German Research Community.

The Max Planck Institute for Psychiatry, Munich, will delve into the basic problems of biological rhythms while the Münster psychiatrists and psychologists will examine the interplay between daily rhythms and various therapeutic measures ranging from anti-depressive drugs all the way to sleep centres. *df*

(Die Welt, 4 October 1980)

Changing personal habits help boost life span

The population explosion began, together with industrialisation, in the first half of the 19th century. But only now has it become a major problem.

According to American estimates, the world population will rise to 6.5 billion by the year 2000.

In 1970, it was 3.6 billion and at the turn of the century only 1.6 billion.

While the population is hardly rising any more in the industrialised countries — in the Federal Republic of Germany it is falling — the developing countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia present an entirely different picture.

There, the annual birth rate per 1,000 is between 30 and 50 while only between 10 and 25 people die. This makes for an annual population growth of 2.3 per cent. And this in turn means that the world population will double within one generation.

It is against this backdrop that Professor Gustav Adolf Martini made his opening address at the 111th Congress of the Society of German Natural Scientists and Doctors in Hamburg.

As a medical doctor, Professor Martini attributes the population explosion to a change in the environment, different dietary habits and the successful fight against infectious diseases.

Since the 19th century, he told the Congress, medicine has undergone considerable changes. Typhoid, ty[phus, tu]berculosis, diphtheria and scarlet [fever] have stopped being killer diseases. [There] has been a major drop in the [...] of infants and children.

And since the diet in the [...] countries has improved greatly [...] people have starved; and so the [...] rate as a whole has diminished.

Medical progress in the past 1[...] has increased the life expectancy [from] 45 at the beginning of this [century to] 70 years now.

For the medical profession, [...] the true reasons of the population [ex]plosion — though other explanations [are] possible and plausible.

The "old" killer diseases occur [in] some developing countries, and [...] there medicine has broken their [...] Moreover, modern drugs can be [...] where they are needed within hours.

As opposed to the largely [...] infectious diseases, the great ailments [of] our day and age are partly self-[...] said Professor Martini. The [...] both with the individual and with [socie]ty as a whole.

Among the chronic diseases [...] day account for 80 per cent of all [...] Professor Martini listed not only [arte]riosclerosis and other cardiovascular [dis]orders but also diabetes, chronic [bron]chitis and cirrhosis of the liver.

Most of these disorders deve[lop in] early adulthood and progress very [...] not to become manifest until mi[ddle age] or later.

Medicine is still powerless against [...] major diseases. Progress is u[...] come from drugs or new therap[ies] [...] calls for a change in man's way of [...]

"Since America started prop[...] new type of diet, since hypertension [has] become treatable and since smok[ing has] been recognised as the number [one cul]prit, deaths from coronary disorders [and] strokes have diminished," Professor [Mar]tini told the delegates.

All this lends more weight to the adage that prevention is better [than] cure.

Professor Martini called emph[atically] for more state support for epidemi[ology] and preventive medicine in the [Federal] Republic of Germany.

Konrad Müller-C[...]

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 Septe[mber 1980])

■ SOCIAL WELFARE

Onward Christian Soldiers – the march goes on

Emma Rauscher, 65, has been fighting violence, atheism, alcoholism and loneliness for the past 58 years. She is a *Heilsarmee* (Salvation Army) major.

There is little life on Kassel's Heckerstraße in the early hours of a Sunday morning. Yet the curtains behind a basement apartment window are drawn apart as early as 7 a.m.: Emma Rauscher is getting ready for another day.

Sunday is like any other day for her: it begins with a brief service in the Salvation Army chapel.

Shortly after ten, Major Rauscher and a group of other Salvation Army soldiers walk through the city streets. Usually, there are three of them and rarely more than four or five.

Otto Soltmanowski, 60, has slung his bugle over his shoulder and the hymn book is ready in his pocket. Captain Horn, 35, is the group's drummer. They are accompanied by Captain Siebel, 38, and 15-year-old Monika in tow. "The Lord be praised; Sunday comes and the week begins anew."

Today they are on a "courtyard mission": windows open and the tenants throw small coins. The coins that come from the upper storeys are wrapped in paper and the marksmanship is frequently poor.

Emma Rauscher collects the money, rattles her collection box in a gesture of thanks and moves on.

By noon, Major Rauscher has covered 10 kilometres — something she has been doing from the age of 7. Including her weekly "bar missions" she has rounded the equator while working for the Salvation Army.

Her retirement two years ago has changed little. She says: "There's a motor in me which cannot stand still."

Neither below freezing temperatures nor the heat of the midday sun nor tobacco smoke in railroad waiting rooms nor threats by pimps have ever stopped her from selling the Army paper *Der Kriegsruf* (The Warcry).

"Where no other organisation works, where the world is at its darkest — the *Heilsarmee* still has a candle to light," *Der Kriegsruf* writes.

The paper carries stories on the mercy of God, on poor sinners and on their conversion.

Tenacity is part and parcel of everyday life in the 57 Salvation Army corps that are scattered throughout Germany.

Alcoholics and drug addicts, the mentally and physically handicapped, the jobless and the potential suicides, the old and ex-convicts — they all want help.

The Salvation Army operates in 81 countries with 106 languages. It is staffed by 2,700 active officers and several hundred thousand honorary soldiers who do their work free during their spare time.

There are 152 officers and 10,000 Salvation Army soldiers in the Federal Republic of Germany — most of them over 40.

It all started in 1865 in London's poor Whitechapel district.

William Booth and his wife Catherine, the "mother of the Salvation Army", went into action because the Methodist Church provided no social welfare.

Then in 1878, Bramwell Booth, William's son, introduced a militant note in the life of the voluntary social workers. The Salvation Army soldiers had to wear a uniform so that those needing help could identify them at a glance. This resulted in persecution and violence. The detractors had a target at last and they could vent their aggressions on the "bluecoats."

But none of this could stop the spread of the Salvation Army. The first soldiers went to Canada in 1872, to the United States in 1880, France in 1881; and then to Switzerland, India, Sweden, Japan and Latin America.

The first German corps was founded in Stuttgart in 1886. At that time, many pubs carried warning notices reading: "No admission for hawkers and members of the Salvation Army."

When school in Reutlingen was over for the day, there was one first grader who rarely went home: little blonde Emma was only 7 when she was attracted to the Salvation Army back in 1922.

Reminisces Major Rauscher: "Every penny of my pocket money went straight to the marketplace where the Salvation Army soldiers gathered."

When the soldiers moved on, Emma — having deposited her money in the collection box — tailed along.

Ten years later — 16 by then — she went to work in an embroidery shop and felt ready for conversion. Asked "Will you give your life to Jesus?" she answered a Salvation Army captain with a firm "yes."

Then she signed the 16 "Articles of War", became a recruit and turned over 10 per cent of her wages as membership dues. When her father for the first time saw her in her new uniform he tore off the collar badges with the big "H" on them (for *Heilsarmee*), saying: "You'd better earn some money instead."

On 15 January 1945 during an air raid alert in Reutlingen, Emma and her mother rushed to the shelter; but then Emma went upstairs again to collect some important documents she had forgotten.

She was still going through the papers when the first bombs hit the city.

Walls collapsed, and there was a chaos of thunder and dust.

Major Rauscher: "I threw myself on the floor and waited for the end. But nothing happened."

It was then that she vowed to devote herself entirely to the Salvation Army. After the war, she gave up her apartment and her job and joined the Salvation Army in Herne as a cadet. It was July 1947, and the first postwar course of the German cadet school.

Only a year later, she was promoted to captain and served in 11 German cities in the next 12 years.

In Herborn, a man proposed to her while she stood weathering the cold and selling *Der Kriegsruf*. She turned the suitor down, of course.

In fact, once before, in Reutlingen, she dissolved an engagement because her fiance refused to join the Salvation Army.

In Hamburg, she built up a kindergarten, and in Bonn and Kiel she worked for prisoners.

Her worst years were 1953/54 in Freudenstadt: "All I had left to live on from my salary was DM25 a month."

Emma Rauscher began her Reeperbahn duty in Hamburg in 1970.


She says: "It was my nicest Christmas. I spent it with 150 alcoholics, lonely people and prostitutes. They were all so grateful for our gifts."

It is not a very propitious time for the Salvation Army. Fewer and fewer young people are prepared to embark on a life of sacrifice. As a result, enrolment at the

Continued on page 15



Bringing the message to the people: Major Emma Rauscher (centre) and fellow soldiers. (Photo: BUNTE/Herzog)



Karl Göpfert and young friends: when it's time to go to bed, there is no argu[ment] (Pho[to] ...)

Dial a grand[...] (or a grandpa)

DIE WELT

Karl Göpfert, 72, of Hamburg i[s] ... of those people who mu[st] ... something to do — a way of li[fe] ... remained unchanged even after th[e] ... mer ship's steward retired last yea[r].

Today, he has a one-person hous[e] to look after, he shops for old or h[andi]capped ladies and drives them t[o] ... cemetery to visit the graves of ... loved ones and is available as a ... ter. Its a dial-a-grandpa situation.

About a year ago, Beate Cramer[-Har]wardt, herself the mother of two c[...] ters, started her "Grandma Servic[e]".

Her telephone hasn't stopped ... since.

One of the big problems fo[r] ... clients occurs when their child su[...] starts running a high fever an[d] ... parents have run out of the fiv[e] ... "child sickness leave" due to them ... year.

Should they go to the family ... and ask him to report them sick?

Frau Cramer, once a working ... herself, was familiar with the si[...]. It was this that gave her the idea ... her dial-a-grandma service.

Now, she has 60 women ... tween 41 and 78 and one man (Karl [Göp]fert) available.

They tell the children fairy tale[s] ... them in and kiss them goodnight.

Frau Cramer-Harwardt: "I co[uld] ... with another 100 helpers. The 60 ... have, have more than enough to ... meet the 200 requests that co[me] every month."

Karl Göpfert, a widower for five ... prefers working in the evenings. He ... prefers children who are already ... trained and old enough to be told ... ies, mostly from his vast treasure ... seagoing tales.

Grandpa Karl is a strict disciplin[arian] ... and when he says it's bedtime that['s ex]actly what he means.

And when nothing else helps ... resorts to the story of the polic[eman] ... who goes from house to house ... down the names of all the children ... are not yet asleep — it's never ... known to fail.

... pre-war Pomerania, he joked, more ... [chil]dren were once reported to have ... born in villages where storks did ... return to their nests than in villages ... [whe]re they did.

Maren Stark[...] (Die Welt, 1 Octob[er 1980])

[T]here are times," said Dr Krause, senior surgeon at the Hesse State [Ort]hopaedic Clinic in Kassel, "when [box]ers' corns ache more than their [hea]ds."

After the two-day course on medical [aspe]cts of boxing held by the Sports [Med]icine Association at his hospital [such] throw-away comments no longer [seem]ed appropriate to the subject.

... hours of lectures, debate and ... left no-one in the mood to poke ... at the health hazards of boxing, [Ever]yone was in a pensive mood and [mor]e knowledgeable.

[T]his did not mean they had changed ... necessarily. Whether you are for or [agai]nst the noble art continues to be a [matt]er of personal conviction.

[Ei]ther a member of the medical pro[fessi]on believes deliberate blows to the ... are tolerable or he doesn't.

[The]re are no clearly established facts [on w]hether boxing is dangerous, espe[cial]ly in the long term, let alone how [dan]gerous it may be.

[I]t is too early to expect significant in[teri]m findings from the 10-year probe of [lon]g-term damage that is being underta[ke]n by the Federal Institute of Sports [Sci]ence, Cologne.

The probe was only launched in 1975 [and] is far from sure to be completed.

[S]tatistics," said Professor Grebe, [chair]man of the medical commission of [the] amateur code's international govern[ing] body, "can be adduced to prove any[thi]ng."

No-one at the course settled for the ... way out, certainly not Helmut

■ SPORT

Doctors discuss hazards of boxing

Rantze, team manager of the West German Amateur Boxing Association.

Herr Rantze, who is responsible for training amateur boxing coaches, reckoned boxing was not a discipline with wide appeal.

Boxers needed to train three times a week. If they failed to put in sufficient training they would either hang up their gloves or run the risk of self-destruction.

Nowhere was failure to undertake the necessary training punished as severely as in the ring, so more training needed to be put in under the supervision of qualified trainers.

There must be no bouts between juniors under the age of 14, not even training geared specifically to the sport's requirements.

But these conclusions and recommendations are a far cry from what actually goes on.

Professor Martin of Kassel University, national team manager in the Nordic skiing events, dealt with the problem from the viewpoint of the juveniles for whom he saw himself as assuming responsibility.

As an educationalist he felt young boxers in particular continually underwent a crisis of identity because their sport was repeatedly called into question.

Are boxers social outcasts? In view of the bitter criticism they face from many quarters they tend to feel that is how they are rated.

Besides, a defeat in the ring often deals morale a severe blow. "Boxers," Professor Martin concluded, "are particularly in need of protection."

Their seconds, especially in the provinces, do not even measure up to the minimum requirement, that of consoling the loser.

All seconds, as a general rule, have yet to learn that their fighters must be whisked out of the ring the moment they are no longer fit to take the punishment.

Scientists may be doing their best to lend amateur boxers a helping hand, but what they have to offer is no more than part of a more complex reality than can be simulated in what correspond to laboratory conditions.

The department of physical education at West Berlin's Free University, for instance, has had boxers thump away at a DM12,000 electronic punchbag to measure the force and speed of their punches and the speed of their reactions.

The results elicited no more than a wry smile from anyone with practical knowledge of boxing.

The West Berlin findings were, for example, that a 75kg man punched the bag with the force of seven hundredweight. The blow took an average 0.34 seconds to prepare, whereas the putative boxer at the receiving and took at least half a second to react.

The answer, or solution, is, as any boxer knows, footwork or, to use a scientific term, anticipation.

"The conclusions boxing organisations reach are not for the medical profession to take," said Professor Sellier, the physicist head of Bonn University's department of forensic medicine.

He had nonetheless implied that boxing with eight-ounce gloves was irresponsible. "If boxers wear ten- or twelve-ounce gloves would anyone still go to watch them?" he asked.

Herr Rantze said the sum total of blows mattered more than the weight of gloves worn. "A knockout is preferable to someone fighting on regardless, working on the assumption that nothing will happen anyway."

Waldkirch neurologist Professor Metzel seemed plagued by doubts: "Ten per cent of amateurs can be reckoned to suffer from nerve trouble."

This was a figure he had read, and an alarming proportion it is too, but Professor Grebe doubted it was accurate: "The figures were compiled by an orthopaedic specialist, a doctor who specialises in knee trouble."

This may have put paid to the exact figure but it by no means eliminated the overall prospect of lasting nervous damage.

Professor Metzel was doubtful whether the electroencephalograph provided any real clue to the answer. He said it was only partly suitable for indicating whether or not damage had been sustained.

While conceding that doctors did not see what went on in the ring and viewed the situation from a special vantage point, Professor Metzel nonetheless ventured to claim:

"We are on firm ground. The risk is calculable."

Was this schizophrenic? Professor Lübs of Kassel University drew a practical conclusion:

"We must reduce the opportunities of injury before we have established the percentages."

This, he said, could take years, not to say decades.

It was to the organisers' credit, given that they were keen to reduce prejudice against amateur boxing and demonstrate "how healthy amateur boxing is" (Professor Lübs), that they invited critics of the sport to attend the gathering.

Dr Döring, spokesman on sport for the Protestant Church, posed a number of questions supporters of the noble art would do well to consider.

Is boxing not the very opposite of education for peace? Does not the constitutionally guaranteed inviolability of the individual apply to the whole person, not just the body?

Is sport a free-for-all in which death is rated less alarming than, say, at work? These were queries to which advocates of boxing did not take kindly.

It was as though they felt the questions did not apply to them but they were nonetheless under fire.

Peace-loving amateur boxers and supporters of the code do indeed feel surrounded by aggressive opponents who see amateurs and professionals in the same light.

Critics, they claim, know little or nothing about the exemplary safety precautions enforced by the West German Amateur Boxing Association.

Yet there can be no gainsaying one point critics make. Boxing, in either code, entails a deliberate attack on the opponent's head.

Ought this to be allowed? Theologian Dr Döring is at a loss to say. So are many doctors.

Five hundred members of the Hesse Sports Medicine Association were polled to find out whether they were interested in working as ring doctors. The response was negligible.

Boxing is an undeniable crowd-puller. It calls for fitness, and boxing training makes you fit. But accidents will happen.

Proponents of boxing argue, however, that they need not occur if the rules were strictly observed.

Then there is the philosophical question. Do you put up your fists to attack someone or to defend yourself? Herr Rantze naturally argues the case for self-defence.

Yet not even the most defensive of boxers can afford to dispense with the services of the medical profession.

Hans-Joachim Leyenberg
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 1 October 1980)

Continued from page 14

Bochum cadet school is diminishing. So are honorary helpers.

Among the two most important reasons are the absolute necessity to convert to Jesus Christ — something many who are not religious hesitate to do — and the strict discipline that prevails.

Colonel Larson: "We have constant trouble with soldiers who don't abide by their obligations. This means that their comrades must lead them back to the right path."

But notwithstanding the loss of membership, the Salvation Army is determined to stick to its stringent rules.

Any departure would jeopardise its very foundations. The organisation now pins its hopes on the fact that many of its honorary members were once stranded themselves and were helped back onto their feet by the Salvation Army.

Emma Rauscher: "They are our most eager soldiers."

Mathias Welp
(Die Welt, 4 October 1980)